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VIACOM V. YOUTUBE:
A PROVING GROUND FOR DMCA SAFE

HARBORS AGAINST SECONDARY LIABILITY
BRETT WHITE*
INTRODUCTION

Copyright law appears to be set for some landscape changing
shockwaves pending the conclusion of Viacom's forthcoming case against
defendants YouTube and Google.l The media giant, Viacom, contends that
YouTube, 2 a wholly owned subsidiary of Google, secondarily infringes
upon its copyrighted broadcasts by failing to take adequate measures to
prevent users from uploading such content onto their servers. Viacom has
alleged all three theories of secondary infringement available under current
jurisprudence. 3 YouTube and Google have steadfastly maintained their
innocence, averring that they are sheltered by the protective eaves of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (hereinafter DMCA) of 1998. 4 This is
the latest in a line of cases laying siege to digital technologies capable of
reproducing copyrighted works (so-called "dual use" devices), 5 and
* J.D., June 2009, St. John's University School of Law, B.S. Biology, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, May 2000.
1 See Denise Howell, Viacom v. Youtube Represents a Watershed Moment in Video Policy,
LAWGARITHMS, Mar. 14, 2007, http://blogs.zdnet.com/Howell/?p=108 (quoting Google's senior
litigation counsel Michael Kwun, "If we don't at least litigate to the point where we get rulings on the
issues that matter to us, we're left with less clarity in the law"); see also Steven Seidenberg, Copyright
in the Age of YouTube: As User Generated Sites Flourish, Copyright Law Struggles to Keep Up, 95
A.B.A. J. 46, 49 (2009) (arguing that a Viacom victory in the instant litigation would drive other user
generated sites out of business).
2 See generally YouTube.com, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2010).
YouTube.com is a video-sharing website that allows account holders to upload content onto its servers.
Id. YouTube requires account holders to agree to its terms of use and requires users to respect
intellectual property. Id. Nevertheless, YouTube does not investigate user-generated content at the
point of upload, and instead reacts to violations after third party complaints. Id.
3 These theories, to be discussed later in the note, are contributory liability, vicarious liability and
inducement.
4 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
5 Sverker K. Hogberg, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright

STJOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:4

represents an opportunity for the courts or Congress to clear up the
confusion surrounding secondary infringement claims as well as the scope
of the available safe harbors.
In addition to direct infringement claims, Viacom's complaint alleges
that YouTube has induced infringement (Count IV),6 contributorily
infringed upon (Count V),7 and vicariously infringed upon (Count VI)8
plaintiffs' copyrighted material. The complaint also accuses YouTube of
knowledge of the infringing material present on its website and further
alleges that YouTube has been refusing to use filtering technology in order
to identify and remove copyrighted works 9 unless the copyright owners
grant them a license. These licenses would be granted on terms
presumably favorable to YouTube, coercing copyright holders into the
choice between a lesser of two evils; either sign over a license or continue
to allow your copyrights to be infringed upon. 10 Viacom withdrew from
licensing negotiations with YouTube in February 2007, with Viacom
complaining that YouTube failed to offer a fair market value in exchange
for its licenses.' I
YouTube counters that it is shielded by section 512(c)(1) of the
DCMA,12 which reads in relevant part:
§512(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of
users.

Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 912 (2006) (noting that a "dual use" device is a device that is capable of
both infringing and non-infringing uses).
6 Complaint at 21, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No.
1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
7 Id. at 23.
8 Id.
9 Geraldine Fabrikant & Saul Hansell, Viacom Tells YouTube: Hands Off, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 3,
2007, at Cl (noting YouTube's alleged position that it requires a licence to show Viacom's content as a
prerequisite to filtering Viacom's material).
10 See Bruce Boyden,
Viacom
v. Youtube, PRAWFSBLAWG,
Mar.
15,
2007,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/03/viacornL-v-youtub.html (quoting Complaint at 7,
540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. l:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611) (discussing allegation by
Viacom that YouTube used coercive measures in order to obtain licenses on favorable terms); see also
Fabrikant & Hansell, supra note 9 (mentioning that Viacom perceived YouTube's lack of copyright
filtering, when the company had access to such technology, as a way of forcing copyright holders to
deal with YouTube).
II Elinor Mills, Copyright Quagmirefor Google and YouTube, ZDNET NEWS, MAR. 14, 2007,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588-22-151527.html (highlighting the breakdown in negotiations due to
YouTube's unwillingness to offer fair market value in exchange for Viacom's licenses); Keith Regan,
Viacom to Youtube: Dump Infringing Content, E-COMMERCE TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.
ecommercetimes.com/story/55548.html (reporting on filing of the YouTube lawsuit, and Viacom's
allegations that negotiations broke down due to YouTube's unwillingness to pay fair market value for
Viacom's licenses).
12 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2009).
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1) In general- A service provider shall not be liable ... for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider (A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;

acts

(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right
and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity.
To escape liability, YouTube must qualify for section 512 protection and
satisfy (A), (B), and (C). However, the components of paragraph (A) are
disjunctive and only one segment needs to be satisfied. YouTube contends
that it responds promptly to any notice of infringing material by removing
the content and that it is therefore entitled to the DMCA's safe-harbor
subsection under (A)(iii).13 Viacom counters that YouTube has
intentionally built up a library of copyrighted works on its servers in order
14
to attract advertisers from which YouTube "directly" benefits financially.
If accepted as fact, this contention removes any protection afforded by the
DMCA section 512(c) as YouTube then could not satisfy subsection (B). 15
Through the lens of this lawsuit, part I of this note will examine the
different theories of secondary infringement and the corresponding
13 See Nate Anderson, Youtube: Viacom Dumping Piranhas in Our DMCA Safe Harbor, ARS
TECHNICA, May 27, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/05/youtube-viacom-dumpingpiranhas-in-our-safe-harbor.ars (noting that YouTube claims it is exactly the type of service Congress
intended to cover under the safe harbor provision); Mills, supranote 11 (quoting Glenn Brown as saying
"The DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act) makes it very clear that Web hosting companies like
YouTube . . . enjoy a safe harbor provided they make the removal process (of copyrighted material)
straightforward for content providers as laid out by statute. We meet those requirements and go above
and beyond them in helping content providers identify copyright infringements.").
14 Complaint at 3, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No.
1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
15 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2009) (requiring that a service provider not directly financially
benefit from the infringing activity in order to be sheltered by the safe harbor provision).
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defenses in order to reveal the relative strengths and weaknesses of
Viacom's and YouTube's contentions. In part II of the note, the safe
harbor provisions under section 512 of the DMCA and Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Sony)16 will be examined in the
context of available case law and legislative history. These two safe
harbors constitute defenses available to alleged secondary infringers that
can shield them from pecuniary liability and injunction even in the face of a
finding of secondary infringement.17 At present, however, it is unclear to
what degree these safe harbors apply and to what extent they overlap.
Apart from the debatable scope of these safe harbors, copyright holders and
technological innovators may have other tools at their disposal that can
provide a solution to the secondary infringement dilemma. The final
portion of this note, part III, discusses two potential extra-judicial solutions.
I. SECONDARY LIABILITY As INTERPRETED BY THE JUDICIARY HAS
PRODUCED A BROAD FIELD OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY AS WELL AS
IMPORTANT SAFE HARBORS

Secondary liability has been adopted from common law principles. Over
the course of the twentieth century, the judiciary has refined the elements
of the different theories of liability applicable against a party who has not
directly infringed, but has created a productl8 that is capable of
infringement and either contributed to user's direct infringement, or turned
a blind eye to infringement while profiting there from. The former is
commonly known as "contributory infringement" while the latter is called
"vicarious liability."1 9 Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Metro16 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
17 See Lauren Brittain Patten, From Safe Harbor to Choppy Waters: YouTube, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, and a Much Needed Change of Course, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 179,
187 (2007) (suggesting that the Sony safe harbor holds that "if there are "substantial noninfringing uses"
for an article - actual or potential - then a court should not impute knowledge for the purpose of
evaluating contributory infringement."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2009) (explaining that a service
provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or
other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider).
18 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
secondary liability is not limited to those that create dual use products, liability can also be found from
the hosting of a directly infringing activity); see also Inwood Laboratories, Inc., v. Ives Laboratories,
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854-55 (1982) (noting that a manufacturer or distributor may be contributory liable
for infringement as a result of continuing to supply a product to one whom it knows or has reason to
know is engaging in trademark infringement).
19 See R. Carter Kirkwood, When Should Computer Owners Be Liable for Copyright Infringement
by Users?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 709, 718-22 (1997) (describing vicarious and contributory infringement
by computer users); see also Angela R. Dean, Expanding the Doctrinesof Vicarious and Contributory
Copyright Infringement: Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. Targets the Primary Distribution

2010]

VIACOM V YOUTUBE

Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1/),20 recognized
a new theory of secondary liability, adding to the weapons in plaintiffs'
arsenal against copyright infringers. 2 1 Incidentally and unfortunately, that
case confused technological innovators who are now unsure whether their
new products and inventions will ultimately subject them to secondary
liability once the products are placed in the hands of individual users on the
market. 22 To ease this uncertainty, the judiciary and legislative branches
have endeavored to protect certain classes of non-culpable, technological
innovators by providing safe harbors in case law 23 and by passing the
aforementioned DMCA.24
A. TraditionalTheories of Secondary Liability
Contributory liability for infringement is perhaps the most flexible of the
theories for secondary infringement. Courts have often struggled to define
the standards necessary for a finding of liability under this theory. An early
and oft-cited attempt was seen in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, InC. 2 5 The Gershwin court defined contributory
liability as requiring "knowledge of the infringing activity, [and]
induc[ing], caus[ing] or materially contribut[ing] to the infringing conduct
of another." 26 There, a management company organized and promoted
concerts for performing artists and printed the names of works to be
performed by the artists in concert programs without regard to whether or
not the works were copyrighted.2 7 The court of appeals followed the
Channels for Counterfeit Merchandise, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 119 (1997) (explaining the
elements of contributory and vicarious infringement).
20 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (finding that distributors of free software used to download copyrighted
files can beheld liable for contributory infringement regardless of lawful uses due to the software's
object of promoting use to infringe copyright).
21 Id. at 936-37 (holding that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,
is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties").
22 See Id. at 959-60 (Breyer, J., concurring) (opining that inventors and entrepreneurs would often
be left guessing about how a court would weigh the values of infringing and non-infringing uses); see
also Posting of Andrew to Legislating IP, http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/ (Oct. 10, 2006, 15:16 EST)
(noting that although the Supreme Court issued a 9-0 opinion in Grokster III, it neutered any clarity in
the secondary infringement regime through the concurrences of Breyer and Ginsburg).
23 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding
that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for a legitimate, unobjectionable purpose").
24 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2007).
25 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) (discussing contributory infringement liability).
26 Id. at 1162.
27 See id. at 1161 (explaining that while the Copyright Act does not specify the level of
participation required for copyright infringement liability, it has long been held that one is susceptible
to liability even if he/she has not performed the copyrighted composition).
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district court's ruling and found the requisite intent inherent in these printed
programs since the management company knew the artists would be
performing some copyrighted works without seeking licensing from the
copyright holders. 28 In addition to this intent, which satisfies the
"knowledge" requirement, some kind of inducement or material
contribution to the infringing activity must be present to find contributory
liability. 29 This was obvious in Gershwin; the printing and distribution of
the programs (where unlicensed songs were listed) as well as the staging of
the concerts (where the songs were performed) was at the very heart of the
management company's business and materially contributed to the direct
infringement. 30
In a more recent case, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.(NapsterI),31 a
district court in the ninth circuit found that the peer-to-peer file sharing
innovator Napster, Inc. had both actual and constructive knowledge that its
service was used to infringe copyright by its users. There was direct
evidence that the founders of Napster knew that users were sharing
copyrighted music via the service. 32 The court noted that even without this
actual knowledge of infringement, the constructive knowledge of
infringement is enough to satisfy the intent requirement. 33 Additionally,
the plaintiffs also had to show that Napster somehow materially contributed
to or induced the users' infringement. 34 The court found that by providing
28 See id. at 1163 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 581,
583 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)) (noting that CAMI's pervasive participation in the formation and direction of this
association and its programming of compositions presented amply support the district court's finding
that it "caused this copyright infringement").
29 See ChillingEffects.com, What is ContributoryInfringement?,http://www.chillingeffects.org
/dmca5l2/question.cgi?QuestionlD=268 (last visited Apr. 22 , 2010) (noting that contributory
infringement can be found by providing an online forum where users can either download or upload
infringing content if the provider knows of such activity); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Ass'n,
494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1161) (noting that "a defendant is a
contributory infringer if it (1) has knowledge of a third party's infringing activity, and (2) 'induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct').
30 See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1161 (holding that printing programs where copyrighted works were
listed and providing all the necessaries for the actual infringing performances materially contributes to
the infringement of copyright).
31 114 F. Supp. 2d. 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the plaintiff's burden of proof in asserting a
copyright infringement claim).
32 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). "[C]o-founder
Sean Parker mentioned "the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses 'since they
are exchanging pirated music' "; and (2) the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")
informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files, some of which [were] still available." Id. See
also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d. 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000). "The evidence
indicates that Napster executives downloaded infringing material to their own computers using the
service and promoted the website with screen shots listing infringing files." Id. at 919.
33 Id. at 918 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163) (noting that constructive or implied knowledge of
infringement is enough to satisfy the knowledge element of contributory infringement).
34 Id. at 919 (noting that plaintiffs met the Fonovisa burden of showing material contribution).
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software that allowed users to search for and download copyrighted files
from other Napster users, the peer-to-peer software provider acted, in
effect, as a conduit for direct copyright infringement. 35 It was of no
importance to the court that Napster was a free service to users.
The theory of vicarious liability is related to, and to a degree, hopelessly
intertwined with, the theory of contributory. The second circuit relied on
this theory in deciding Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.36
There, the defendant store, Green, was held to be liable for operating a
record department that was selling unlicensed, bootleg copies of records
made by direct infringers. 37 The court held that a defendant can be held
vicariously liable where he has (1) the right and ability to supervise or
control the direct infringer's activity and (2) financially benefits from this
infringing activity. 38 Although no element of knowledge is required to find
vicarious liability, some courts imply that this knowledge is imputed to an
39
infringer that exerts control over and profits from the direct infringement.
To again use Napster 140 as a contemporary example, even though
Napster did not directly profit by charging users a fee, the court found that
they nevertheless had economic incentives in increasing its user-base.4 1 In
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1/),42 the Ninth Circuit held
that "[flinancial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material
'acts as a "draw" for customers.' 43 As to the element of control, there was

35 See id. at 920 (comparing the Napster peer-to-peer service to the defendants in Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) where the defendants provided parking,
advertising and facilities to vendors at a swap meet where the defendants knew copyrights were being
infringed by the vendors, thereby materially contributing to their infringement).
36 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
37 Id. at 306.
38 See Id. at 307; see also Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that a
landlord is not vicariously liable for the copyright infringement of a tenant on the leased premises
where the landlord has surrendered control of the premises and does not supervise the tenant thereon);
but see Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929)
(finding the proprietor of a performance hall liable for the infringing performance of copyrighted works
by an artist where the proprietor profits from increased number of customers on-site even where the
proprietor has no knowledge of the artist's direct infringement).
39 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (noting
that if vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold
equipment with constructive knowledge of the potential for infringement); see also Polygram Int'l.
Publ'g., Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (D. Mass. 1994) (explaining that actual
knowledge is not required for a finding of vicarious liability where the defendant exploits and has an
opportunity to supervise the infringing activity).
40 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
41 See id. at 921 (citing internal Napster documents that stated that revenues would be driven up
directly from increases in user base).
42 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
43 Id. at 1023 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir.
1996)).
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direct evidence, provided by Napster itself, that Napster policed its servers
to remove users that were the subject of copyright-holder complaints. 44
The court saw this as tantamount to an admission that Napster had the right
and ability to supervise its service, thus satisfying the other element of
vicarious liability.
In a case that many hoped would bring clarity to the secondary liability
debacle, Grokster 11145 introduced a new theory of secondary infringement.
There, the creators of "peer-to-peer" software were sued by various
copyright holders under various theories of secondary liability.4 6 In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found merit in the "inducement"
claim brought by plaintiffs and did not reach the broader issue of whether
47
defendants were liable under traditional theories of secondary liability.
Because of clear evidence in the record that the defendants were soliciting
the former users of a peer-to-peer service previously shut-down by the
courts, and because of the high volume of infringing activity taking place
via the defendant's networks, the Court found that defendants actively
induced users to infringe upon copyrighted works via their dual-use
products. 48 The Court recognizes that the inducement theory of liability is
limited to a particular set of facts where there is clear evidence
demonstrating an active and affirmative intent that users of the dual-use
product infringe upon copyrighted works. 49 Being so limited, concurring
opinions by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer attempted to flesh out the scope
of the Sony defense to contributory infringement absent the active

44 See Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920-21 (comparing Fonovisa,Inc., 76 F.3d at 262 where the
defendants were able to bar particular vendors from the swap meet to Napster that was able to remove
particular users known to be infringing upon copyrights).
45 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (adopting the inducement rule found in patent law for use in third
party copyright infringement analysis).
46 Id. at 920-21 (summarizing Plaintiffs' claims).
47 Id. at 931 n.9 (explaining that because the court resolved the case based on an inducement
theory, there is no need to analyze separately MGM's vicarious liability).
48 Id. at 939-40. The Court found that the intent to induce infringement was easily satisfied for
three reasons: 1) each defendant was targeting former Napster users in their advertising; 2) neither
company attempted to provide any affirmative filtering tools to prevent or diminish users from directly
infringing; 3) the advertising revenues were dependant upon a high-volume of use, much of which was
infringing use. Id. The Court notes that although this third reason is evidence of intent to induce
infringement, taken alone it would not be sufficient to provide for this intent. Id.
49 See id. at 936-37. It is important to note that many courts apply the inducement theory as an
element of the theory of contributory infringement. Courts commonly look first to see if an allegedly
contributorily infringing party has either materially contributed to infringement or induced infringement
before moving on to whether they had knowledge or intent of such infringement. Inducement thus
satisfies the first prong of the contributory infringement test. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l. Serv.
Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007). The court held that defendant neither induced nor materially
contributed to infringement by providing a payment system to several websites that were directly
infringing on plaintiff's copyrights. Id.
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inducement. 50 The concurrences strongly indicate that the battle over
contributory and vicarious liability has yet to be fully waged. 5 1
B. The Sony Safe HarborDefense to Contributory and Vicarious Liability
In Sony, 52 the Supreme Court introduced a safe-harbor provision
protecting certain dual-use technologies, reigning in secondary liability,
and preventing the stifling of technological innovation. Plaintiffs sued a
VTR manufacturer under a theory of contributory infringement based on
the distribution of devices that allowed users to copy copyrighted television
programs. 53 The Supreme Court considered the taping of these programs a
mere "time-shifting" of the works, and accordingly found this to be a fair
use based upon evidence in the record that many of the copyright owners
did not object to the "time-shifting" of their programming. 54 The Court
fleshed out a "staple article of commerce" 55 safe-harbor provision, coopted from patent law's statutory code 56 that shields producers of dual-use
devices from liability when their product is "merely... capable of
substantial non-infringing uses." 57 Accordingly, since time-shifting was a
substantial non-infringing use, the safe harbor defense applied and Sony
was absolved of liability for the manufacture and distribution of its VTRs.
The Sony defense is only available against contributory infringement
claims when the manufacturer of the dual-use product has mere knowledge
of the infringement without more, and, conversely, does not preclude
50 See Grokster II, 545 U.S. at 942, 949 (Ginsburg, J. and Breyer, J., concurring).
51 See id. The concurring opinions will be discussed in section B.
52 464 U.S. 417 (1984), superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, as recognized in Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70503, 79 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2009).
53 Id. at 420 (noting that respondents alleged that some individuals had used Betamax video tape
recorders (VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works which had been exhibited on
commercially sponsored television and contended that these individuals had thereby infringed
respondents' copyrights).
54 Id. at 456 (explaining that respondents failed todemonstrate that time-shifting would cause any
likelihood of non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works).
55 Id. at 426 (highlighting that selling a staple article of commerce -- e. g., a typewriter, a recorder,
a camera, a photocopying machine -- technically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made
thereof, but that this kind of contribution, if deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand the
theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management).
56 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2007). Section 271 covers infringement of patents and provides in
relevant part: (c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not
a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer. Id.
57 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (discussing how the sale of copying equipment does not constitute
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate non-objectionable purposes).

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COAMENTARY

[Vol. 24:4

liability based on the intentional inducement of users to infringe
copyright. 58 The Court made this clear in Grokster III by recognizing and
finding liability under MGM's inducement claim in the face of the potential
for substantial non-infringing uses. 59 Perhaps looking into a crystal ball that
foretold a cloudy and uncertain future, the concurring opinions attempted to
flesh out a more precise scope and definition of the Sony defense. This led
to a sharp divide of opinion among the members of the Court, spear-headed
by Ginsburg's and Breyer's differing opinions on the meaning and import
of the Sony ruling. 60
The key ruling in the Sony case is that the distribution of copying devices
will not result in liability for secondary infringement if the product is
"merely... capable of substantial non-infringing uses." 6 1 Justice Ginsburg
argued for a flexible interpretation of this language, claiming that the
interests of copyright holders in exploiting their creative works should be
balanced against "the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce." 62 This contention stems from the likelihood
that almost all dual use devices can be perceived as potentially capable of
substantial non-infringing uses although, in all likelihood, many will never
realize any of this potential and will continue to be used almost solely for
copyright infringement ad infinitum.63 Ginsburg cited In re Aimster

58 See Grokster111,
545 U.S. at 937 (noting the inapplicability of the substantial non-infringing use
safe harbor when users are intentionally induced to use a service to infringe copyright).
59 See Id. (explaining that the inducement rule premises liability on purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage
innovation having a lawful promise).
60 See Grokster Ili,
545 U.S. at 945-55 (Ginsberg, J. and Breyer, J., concurring). In Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion, she expresses how this case "differs markedly from Sony," based on the
insufficient evidence of non-infringing uses. Id. at 945. Justice Ginsburg found that there was evidence
that Respondent's products were being used to infringe and that the infringement was an overwhelming
source of revenue from the products. Id. at 948. She felt that the Sony standard should not be applied
here in light of this evidence and the lack of evidence to "demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a
reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially noninfringing uses were likely to develop over
time." Id. Justice Breyer, concurring, found it not to be necessary to revisit the Court's decision in
Sony, since the Respondents in this case were actively seeking to advance the infringement. Id. at 951.
Justice Breyer's concurrence would find the Respondents protected under the Sony standard since their
products were "capable" of noninfringing uses, were it not for their active inducement of their
customers to use the products illegally. Id. at 953.
61 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
62 Grokster111,
545 U.S. at 943 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
63 See Katie Dean, File Sharing Has Supreme Moment, WIRED.COM, Mar. 29, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2005/03/67060 (highlighting that more than 90
percent of the content on services such as Grokster and Napster was infringing, despite the multitude of
potentially non-infringing uses); see also Pamela Samuelson, The Gravity of Sony v. Universal: The
Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1831, 1840 (2006) (discussing
that although the Sony Betamax machines had non-infringing capabilities, majority of the owners
utilized the machines for infringing purposes).
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Copyright Litigation,64 to argue in favor of a balancing of infringing and
non-infringing uses, whether actual or prospective, when evaluating dual
use technology, and to show that courts have not strictly adhered to the
language of Sony that requires a mere possibility, no matter how remote, of
a substantial non-infringing use. 65
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, favored a strict interpretation of Sony's
language, and claimed that the opinion offers a clear rule for determining
whether or not purveyors of dual use technologies are shielded from
secondary liability. Breyer specifically focused on the word "capable" and
pointed toward the possibility of as-of-yet undiscovered markets for noninfringing uses. 66 Breyer clarified his understanding of the term "capable"
by noting that it "refers to a plausible, not simply a theoretical, likelihood
that such uses will come to pass, and that fact anchors Sony in practical
reality." 6 7 Additionally, Breyer found that Grokster satisfied its burden of
proof with respect to showing current, substantial, non-infringing uses in
the trial record. 68 He detailed several non-infringing uses for Grokster,
including, research information, public domain films, historical recordings,
digital photos, and freeware. 69 According to Breyer, these uses, although
they comprised only an estimated 10% of Grokster's total file-base,
qualified as "substantial non-infringing use" under Sony when combined
with the potential for future non-infringing uses. 70
These disparate opinions on an issue not even necessary to the
disposition of the underlying case, herald a coming storm. The scope of the
Sony defense is still very much uncertain and, should the Viacom v.
YouTube dispute reach the land's highest court, the tension over the scope
of the safe harbor may at last be delineated, much to the relief of skittish
future innovators. 7 1
64 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
65 See id. at 649-50. "[W]hen a supplier is offering a product or service that has non-infringing as
well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a
finding of contributory infringement ...But the balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only in a
case in which substantial non-infringing uses, present or prospective, are demonstrated." Id.
66 See Grokster II, 545 U.S. at 955 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the booming home-video
market was an unforeseen non-infringing use of the VCR that arose after the Court's holding in Sony).
67 Id. at 958.
68 Id. at 965-66. While Breyer found that Grokster satisfied its burden of proof by showing a
plethora of non-infringing uses, he declined the opportunity to modify Sony (or interpret Sony's
standard more strictly) and joined in the majority opinion finding inducement of infringement. Id. It is
possible that absent the inducement, Justice Breyer would have found that the Sony safe harbor would
have shielded Grokster against contributory and vicarious liability claims.
69 Id. at 954.
70 Id. at 955 (arguing that the foreseeable development of such non-infringing uses, when taken
together with an estimated 10% non-infringing material, is sufficient to meet Sony's standard).
71 It is equally likely that the case will be decided squarely within the framework of the Digital
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C. Interpretationsof the Breadth and Applicability of DMCA section 512
by the Courts
The second major safe harbor available to alleged secondary infringers
can be found in the DMCA.72 In fact, in YouTube's Answer to Viacom's
Complaint, the first defense claimed is that Viacom's claims are barred by
the safe harbors provided in DMCA section 512.73 Congress passed the
DMCA in 1998 to square United States law with the World Intellectual
Property Organization's (hereinafter WIPO) standing treaties, 74 and to
"facilitate the robust development and worldwide expansion of electronic
commerce, communications, research, development, and education in the
digital age." 75
In an action for copyright infringement, secondary liability is determined
without reference to the defenses available under the DMCA; the safe
harbors under section 512 serve only to limit monetary liability and
injunction where applicable. 76 To obtain the protections of the safe harbors
at sections 512 (a) - (d),
Millennium Copyright Act, and that the Court will not reach the Sony safe harbor in deciding the case.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). The DMCA exempts on-line service providers that meet the criteria set
forth in the safe harbor provisions from claims of copyright infringement made against them resulting
from the conduct of their customers. Id.
72 See id. (providing exceptions and limitations on liability to shelter service providers from the
infringing activities of their customers).
73 See Answer, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No.
1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 1724620.
74 See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1-2 (1998); WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 23, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 L.L.M. 65:
The 'Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998' is designed to facilitate the robust development
and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and
education in the digital age. Title I will implement the new World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
thereby bringing U.S. copyright law squarely into the digital age and setting a marker for other
nations who must also implement these treaties. Title II will provide certainty for copyright owners
and Interet service providers with respect to copyright infringement liability online. Title Ill will
provide a clarifying exemption in the Copyright Act to ensure that the lawful owner or lessee of a
computer machine May authorize an independent service technician to activate the computer in
order to service its hardware components. Finally, Title IV will begin to update our nation's
copyright laws with respect to library, archive, and educational uses of copyrighted works in the
digital age.
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
75 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2.
76 Commonly, applicability of the DMCA § 512 safe harbors are evaluated before moving on to
the issue of liability for secondary infringement. This makes sense from the standpoint of judicial
efficiency, as defendants in secondary infringement actions will suffer no repercussions due to
secondary infringement if shielded by § 512's safe harbors. Conversely, inapplicability of DMCA safe
harbors does not preclude other defenses. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544,
552 (4th Cir. 2004). CoStar references the DMCA in holding that a failure of a service provider to avail
itself of certain DMCA defenses does not preclude any other defenses available under current law. Id.
See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiI, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007). The court in Perfect 10
adopts the 4th circuit's language regarding the availability of other defenses. Id.
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a service provider must first meet the threshold conditions set out in
§ 512(i), including the requirement that the service provider: [H]as
adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a
policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of77the service
provider's system or network who are repeat infringers.
The Ninth Circuit of the Court of Appeals has held that implementation
of such a policy requires the institution to have a functioning notification
system with a procedure for dealing with DMCA complaint notifications.
In addition, service providers cannot "actively prevent copyright owners
from collecting information needed to issue such notifications." 78 Service
providers must allow subscribers to learn of repeat copyright infringers. In
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,79 the district court found that Aimster
did not implement a repeat infringement policy because the ISP's
encryption prevented the identification of any particular user's
infringement. 80 Therefore, the court held that Aimster was ineligible for the
DMCA's safe harbor protections.
The court in Perfect 10, Inc. 8 1 also laid out a test for the
"reasonableness" of the implementation of a repeat infringer termination
policy. Repeat infringers must be terminated when "appropriate." 82 This
term is admittedly vague, but has been interpreted to mean that either: (1)
the service provider has gained actual knowledge of a user's repeat
infringement, usually through notification provided by a copyright holder
whose work is being infringed upon; 83 or (2) the service provider has a "red
77 Perfect 10,488 F.3d at 1109.
78 See id.; see also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ellison court
held that reasonable implementation requires an ISP to "(1) adopt a policy that provides for the
termination of service access for repeat copyright infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2)
implement that policy in a reasonable manner; and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy." Id. at 1080.
The court found that because defendants changed their notification email address without notifying the
copyright office, the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that a policy was reasonably
implemented such that the safe harbors under section 512 (a) - (d) of the DMCA applied. Id.
79 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. 111.
2002).
80 See id. at 659 (explaining that a policy of removing repeat infringers is not "implemented" when
the ISP cannot identify repeat infringers due to the nature of their software encryption).
81 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007).
82 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wash., 2004)
(holding that Amazon reasonably implemented a repeat infringer policy although some repeat
infringers, who were terminated, were able to create new accounts with slightly different user names
and noting that policies need not be perfect, but need only be reasonably implemented; therefore,
Amazon was not required to "conduct active investigation of possible infringement or make a decision
regarding difficult infringement issues").
83 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiII, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that a
service provider may have actual knowledge of repeat copyright infringement when a copyright holder
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flag" that infringement is taking place. 84 The case law has consistently held
that service providers are not required to affirmatively police their sites to
unearth this sort of infringement. 85 This is illustrated by the language of
section 512(c), which applies after threshold requirements have been met:
[a] service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief' if it
does not know of infringement. A service provider is also not
liable under § 512(c) if it acts "expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material" when it (1) has actual knowledge,
(2) is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent, or (3) has received notification of claimed
infringement meeting the requirements of §512(c)(3). Were we to
require service providers to terminate users under circumstances
other than those specified in § 512(c), § 512(c)'s grant of
86
immunity would be meaningless.
This indicates that the onus is first placed on the provider of the notice
(usually the copyright holder) to demonstrate both that there is infringing
activity and, if applicable, that the infringer is a repeat-offender. If the
complainant complies with proper notice procedures, the service provider
must respond by expunging the infringing material and, if repeat
infringement has been shown, by terminating that user's access to the
service or website.
This rubric was applied in Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 87 There,
the court held that Amazon's repeat infringer policy was reasonable even
though Amazon had not been able to prevent repeat infringers whose
accounts were terminated from re-opening new accounts under
pseudonyms. 88 This is a clear indication that the threshold implementation
requirement under DMCA section 512(i) does not require active policing
for infringing material in order to gain entitlement to the section 512 safe
informs the provider of the alleged infringement and explaining that owners take affirmative steps by
notifying service providers to remove the material from a particular venue).
84 See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1111 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998)) (suggesting that a red flag is
generally notifications by which it should become apparent that copyright infringement is taking place).
85 Id. at 1109 (suggesting that a service provider need not police its users, but must implement a
system to handle complaints of possible copyright infringements); see also Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at
1104 (holding that Amazon need not conduct active investigation of possible infringement).
86 Perfect 10, 448 F.3d at 1111 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
87 Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (holding that Amazon's infringement policy was reasonable
because Amazon notified the listing vendor via email regarding a copyright infringement, canceled the
listing and warned vendors that repeat violations may result in account termination).
88 Id. (stating that "Amazon's infringement policy has not been able to prevent certain vendors
from reappearing on the zShops platform under pseudonyms . . . [a]lthough this type of behavior is
understandably vexing for a copyright holder like Corbis, it is not clear how Posternow's efforts to
sidestep Amazon's policies amount to a failure of implementation").
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harbors in (a) - (d) provided that the service providers do not have
knowledge of infringing content, or if they do have such knowledge, that
they expeditiously remove the infringing content, and prevent known
repeat offenders from re-registering once blocked.89
As a final hurdle, DMCA section 512(i) requires service providers to
communicate their reasonably implemented, repeat-infringer termination
policy to users or account holders. 90 Courts have been very liberal in
construing this provision, holding that it requires nothing more than a
warning to users in their terms of use statements of their repeat-infringer
policy. 9 1 Users must agree to these terms before availing themselves of the
online service.
Once the threshold requirements of section 512(i) have been met, a party
seeking to escape liability must also conform to the tenants of sections 512
(a) - (d). These sections contain the actual safe-harbors. 92 This note will
confine its discussion of the safe harbors to section 512(c), as this is the
shield applicable to "service providers." For purposes of section 512(c),
section 512(k)(1)(B) defines a "service provider" as "a provider of online
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore." 93 Courts
have construed this liberally as including websites that provide usergenerated content such as Amazon.com's zShops, as well as traditional
internet service providers (ISPs) such as AOL.94 YouTube falls squarely
into this expansive definition.
Moving on to the language of section 512 (c), the service provider must
meet three conditions. The first, subsection (A), involves the service
89 See Id. (finding that although Amazon terminated Postermow's accounts upon receiving
notification of their infringement, Amazon was not liable for not discovering Postermow's new
accounts which were created by skirting Amazon's detection techniques).
90 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (1998) (stating that the service provider shall not be held liable if the
provider "adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the
service provider's system or network of a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are
repeat infringers").
91 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1101-02 (holding that Amazon had communicated its repeat
infringer policy to users through their participation agreement and community rules and that Amazon
complied with DMCA section 512 (i) because it placed users on notice "that they face exclusion from
the service if they repeatedly violate copyright laws."); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F.
Supp. 2d 634, 658 (N.D. 111.2002) (holding that Aimster sufficiently communicated its repeat infringer
policy when it placed a copyright notice on the its site, warning users that repeat infringement could
result in account termination).
92 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (1998).
93 Id. at § 512(k)(1)(B).
94 See, e.g., Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (holding that Amazon is a "service provider," under
the "provider of online services" definition provided in the DMCA § 512(k)(1)(B)); see also
Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 915 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that Amazon falls
within the DMCA's definition of an "internet service provider").
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provider's knowledge of infringing activity taking place on their servers,
and has three disjunctive subcategories: (i) the service provider must have
no actual knowledge of infringement; or (ii) be unaware of "facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent;" or (iii) if it is
aware of the infringing activity, it must "act expeditiously to remove or
disable access to the material." 9 5 The second condition, subsection (B),
concerns profit and control. It requires that the service provider: (1)
receive "no financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
in a case in which [(2)] the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity." 96 The third and final requirement, subsection (C),
requires the disabling of access to or expeditious removal of infringing
content when proper notification is received, putting the service provider
on notice. 97 This provision overlaps with § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and serves as a
stop-gap to ensure that service providers expeditiously remove infringing
content soon after the infringing activity has become apparent where they
initially had no knowledge or notification of the infringing material.
So far, in all but one of the published cases dealing with the knowledge
component of subsection (A), copyright holders have provided the service
providers with written notification of copyright infringement. 98 For obvious
reasons, this is and will continue to be the dominant means by which
copyright holders seek to prove a service provider's knowledge of
infringement. 99 If compliant with the DMCA's notification provisions in

95 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(A).
96 Id. at § 512 (c)(1)(B).
97 Id. at § 512 (c)(1)(C).
98 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.
2004)); ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620-21 (4th Cir. 2001);
Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F.Supp.2d 914, 915 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Hendrickson v. eBay,
Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1084-85 (C.D. Cal. 2001); but see CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164
F. Supp. 2d 688, 703 (D. Md. 2001)). Corbis Corp. is the exception. The court there noted that by
failing to provide DMCA-compliant notification, Corbis "stripped it[self] of the most powerful
evidence of a service provider's knowledge - actual notice of infringement from the copyright holder."
Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. In some of these other cases the notification was ruled as noncompliant with the DMCA. This refutes the satisfaction of the knowledge requirement and usually
results in summary judgment favoring the service provider on the issue of secondary infringement
liability. DMCA compliant notification is discussed in notes 99 and 100 below.
99 A copyright holder will first seek to have a website remove their proprietary content by such a
cease-and-desist notice before deciding to resort to potentially costly legal remedies. See supra cases
note 98. If this notification complies with the DMCA by reasonably identifying the character and
location (by pinpointing URLs) of the infringing material, the copyright holder may then sue for
damages if they so wish. To file a complaint without putting a defendant on notice of the copyright
infringement occurring on their service would likely resort in across-the-board dismissal, unless it can
be proved that the infringing activity is so egregious and apparent that a "red flag" is raised. Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBiI, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2007); see generally supra text accompanying
note 84.
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section 512(c)(3),100 a written notice would satisfy section 512 (c)(1)(A)(i)
and would shift the burden to the service provider to show that it acted
expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material
pursuant to subsection (iii). The determination of expeditious removal is a
factual question and there is very little precedent on this issue. 10 1 Most
likely, expeditious removal would be determined using a "reasonable
person" standard.102
If the copyright holder's notification is insufficient, it may seek to prove,
under section 512 (c)(1)(A)(ii), that the provider knew of "facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."1 03 The
legislative history illustrates that this is not "what a reasonable person
would have deduced given all the circumstances, [but] whether the service
provider deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it
was aware."1 04 This is a burdensome standard to meet for copyright
holders. They typically must show that the service provider advertises their
service as a "pirate" or "bootleg" site. 10 5 In other words, in order to impute
knowledge, the infringement must be readily apparent to a casual
observer. 106
After satisfying the knowledge requirement of section 512(c)(1)(A), the
service provider next must show that it has no ability to control the
infringing content or, in the alternative, that it does not directly benefit
financially from the infringement.107 Instructively, one court has noted that
"the right and ability to control infringing activity, 'as the concept is used
in the DMCA, cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to
remove or block access to materials posted on its website or stored in its

100 A compliant notification must "provide the service provider with adequate information to find
and examine the allegedly infringing material expeditiously." H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 48
(1998) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)).
101 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. The court noted that Amazon would be required to
expeditiously remove the allegedly infringing material after being put on notice. Id. Although the court
refers to DMCA § 512(c)(1)(C) in this instance, the language is identical to § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and so
presumably the only difference is whether knowledge was actual, constructive, or via notification. See
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C).
102 See Jefferson v. Kernan, No. 05-0977, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37525, at *24 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(defining a reasonable person as "an abstract individual of ordinary mental and physical capacity who is
as prudent and careful as any situation would require him to be"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1294 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a "reasonable person" as a "hypothetical person used as a legal standard,
especially to determine whether someone acted with negligence").
103 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
104 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
105 See Id.; see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 48 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
106 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108; see also S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 35 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
107 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(B).
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system.'"1 0 8 According to the district court in Corbis Corp., a right and
ability to control infringing activity requires some kind of direct
supervision by the service provider of the direct infringers.1 09 The court
intimates that if the service provider screens or filters the content, or has its
hands in the sale of a product, it is exercising an ability to control the
content. 1 0 Even if the provider is deemed to have such a right and ability
to control content, it may still be absolved of liability under the DMCA if it
does not derive a direct financial benefit.
The terminology "direct financial benefit" has been interpreted quite
literally. The legislative history instructs that it would not be a considered
a direct financial benefit "where the infringer makes the same kind of
payment as non-infringing users of the provider's service." 1 1 Cases have
distinguished the financial benefit required to remain under the DMCA's
section 512(c) safe harbor from those required to find common law
secondary infringement.11 2 Notably, the Costar Group Inc. court explains:
Whereas in Playboy... , the finding of added value to the
defendant was evidence that the defendant induced the
infringement, for the purposes of the DMCA, the financial
benefit must be "directly attributable to the infringing
activity." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (1998). CoStar might make
an argument that the indirect type of benefit cited in
Hardenburgh is also present here. However, such a benefit
does not fit within the plain language of the statute.
Accordingly, § 512(c)(1)(B) does not present a barrier to
LoopNet remaining in the safe harbor.'13
Therefore, added revenue from incidental increased usage due to the
presence of infringing material is relevant to determining intent and
financial benefit under traditional theories of secondary infringement, but
does not remove a service provider from the DMCA's section 512(c) safe
harbors.114
108 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiII, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Costar
Grou Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001)).
109 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (noting that Amazon does not have the right and ability to
control merely due to their ability to disable material posted on its service).
110 See id. at 1110 (laying out a test for the ability to control content under the DMCA).
1I1 H.R. REp. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998).
112 See Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 705 (D. Md. 2001)
(differentiating the case at bar from Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio
1997), which evaluated traditional theories of secondary copyright infringement and was decided before
the DMCA was signed into law in 1998).
113 Id.at705.
114 Common law secondary infringement is determined without respect to the DMCA. See supra
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The third and final subsection to be satisfied, DMCA section
512(c)(1)(C), serves to restrict access to, or ensure quick removal of the
infringing content soon after a service provider is put on notice by a
copyright holder or by the apparent and prevalent nature of the infringing
activity.11 5 As noted above, very little precedent is available as to what
constitutes expeditious removal. Most likely the same decision standards
will be used in interpreting § 512(c)(1)(C) as section 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), as
the language itself is identical, differing only with respect to how the
6
knowledge of the infringement was itself obtained. 1
II. EVALUATING YoUTUBE'S

LIABILITY UNDER THE

DMCA

AND THE

SECONDARY LIABILITY REGIME

Not surprisingly, YouTube denies all allegations of wrong-doing in its
answer to Viacom's complaint. 17 While YouTube may in fact be liable for
some form of the secondary infringement theories alleged by Viacom11 8 as
described in subsection I(A) of this note, 19 it is likely that the trial court
will adhere to the commonly employed practice of first evaluating
YouTube's potential absolution under DMCA section 512(c) before
moving on to decide the secondary liability issues.1 20 This method makes
sense in terms of judicial efficiency, as the DMCA safe harbors, where
applicable, preclude pecuniary and injunctive relief against a defendant
note 56 and accompanying text. In Costar, the court explained that determining financial benefit under
common law infringement and under the DMCA require different tests and standards. 164 F. Supp. 2d
at 705.
115 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring a service provider, upon notification, to
expeditiously remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity); see lo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 114950 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding service provider Veoh Networks, Inc.'s general practice of responding to
notices of copyright infringement within one day or a few days to comply with DMCA's requirement
that infringing material be expeditiously removed or access disabled); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1106-07 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that if Amazon was put on notice of
infringing content by plaintiff, Amazon would be required to show that the infringing material itself or
users' access to it was quickly removed).
116 See supranotes 101-02 and accompanying text.
117 See Answer, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No.
1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 1724620.
118 See Complaint, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No.
1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
119 See supra notes 25-51 and accompanying text (outlining the currently recognized forms of
secondary copyright infringement).
120 See, e.g., Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (evaluating Amazon's DMCA protection when
granting summary judgment without regard to Amazon's liability under common law theories of
secondary infringement); Jo Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (determining service provider Veoh
Networks, Inc.'s qualification for safe harbor under the DMCA prior to discussing copyright
infringement liability because of the limited injunctive relief available to copyright owners under the
DMCA).
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who has complied with its provisions. 12 1 Therefore, this section will briefly
examine Viacom's complaint and discuss the potential for finding liability
under the common law, followed by the potential absolution offered by the
Sony defense. Since a finding of liability under these traditional regimes is
superfluous if YouTube is protected by the DMCA, this brief discussion
will be followed by the more determinative analysis of whether YouTube is
likely to qualify for the section 512(c) safe harbors; more specifically,
whether YouTube's activities are of the sort that Congress intended to be
protected when they enacted the DMCA.
A. YouTube's PotentialLiability Under Common Law Theories of
SecondaryInfringement
Viacom, et al.122 began their complaint by noting that digital technology
has brought great opportunity to entrepreneurs seeking to legitimately
exploit their intellectual property via the internet and other digital
mediums. 12 3 They contend, however, that with this blessing comes a curse.
With the same ease by which copyright owners can transmit their works
with relative simplicity to a virtually unlimited number of wide-spread
consumers, so too can infringers use the same digital processes to copy and
display these works for their own illegitimate, personal benefit. 124
The argument advanced by Viacom as to YouTube's fault and liability
under the traditional forms of secondary liability is a compelling one. For
example, as discussed above in section I(A), the traditional elements of
contributory infringement involve: (1) knowledge that infringement is
occurring via your device, service or establishment, and (2) a material
contribution, or inducement, to commit such infringement. 12 5 Here, the
knowledge requirement is easily satisfied. Even if YouTube is able to
convince a court that they were nominally unaware of the hundreds of
121 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
122 Viacom International, Inc. is joined in its complaint by co-plaintiffs Comedy Partners, Country
Music Television, INC., Paramount Pictures Corporation, and Black Entertainment Television, LLC.
123 See Complaint at 1, Viacom Int'l. Inc. v. Youtube, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2007) (No. 1:07cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
124 See id. at 2. "YouTube has harnessed technology to willfully infringe copyrights on a huge
scale, depriving writers, composers and performers of the rewards they are owed for effort and
innovation, reducing the incentives of America's creative industries, and profiting from the illegal
conduct of others as well." Id.
125 See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (explaining that one may be liable as a contributory infringer if they cause, induce, or materially
contribute to the infringing conduct of another, with knowledge of such activity); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (defining a contributory infringer as someone
who "'induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another').
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thousands of infringing files that exist on their servers, they were put on
actual notice of such infringing content by the cease-and-desist letters they
received on a daily basis, pursuant to which they removed infringing
content in a manner they contend conforms to the DMCA.126 Additionally,
for the "material contribution" element, it can be argued that by allowing
users to upload, embed, and share videos with no supervision as to their
content at the point of uploading, and having no way of effectively
identifying infringing files, YouTube materially contributes to the
infringement of copyrighted videos.127 In fact, plaintiffs contend that by
allowing users to make videos viewable only by designated "friends" and
by limiting search results to 1,000 results, YouTube is actively preventing
copyright owners from finding infringing videos.1 28 If accepted by the
district court, this bolsters a "material contribution" or an "inducement"
argument considerably.1 29
Additionally, Viacom's complaint alleges that YouTube is intentionally
withholding filtering technologies that would enable them to identify
copyrighted material before it is uploaded.130 This is another strong
indication of material contribution or inducement. YouTube claims that
filtering technologies are not yet reliable, but are in development and will
be instituted as soon as is feasible.'31 According to one source, YouTube
126 See generally Air Force DMCA-Bombs YouTube, http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/
notice.cgi?NoticelD=17583 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). This is an actual take-down notice sent by the
Air Force to YouTube, effectively putting YouTube on notice of infringing content that has been
uploaded onto their servers. Id. As will be discussed below in the note, YouTube needs to have
responded expeditiously to remove this content in order to have retained protection from pecuniary
liability and injunction under § 512(c) of the DMCA.
127 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (holding that because it would
have been difficult for the infringement to take place without the "support services provided by the
swap meet" the infringing activity would not have been able "to take place in the massive quantities
alleged"); see also Cortney M. Arnold, Viacom v. Google: Whose Tube is it Anyway?, DUKE LAW &
TECH. REV. IBLAWG, Mar. 31, 2007, http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/iblawg/index.php?action=
showitem&id=3 (noting that YouTube, beyond its Terms of Use, takes very few steps to actively
prevent the uploading of copyrighted material even though it is undoubtedly aware of infringement and
profits handsomely from it).
128 See Complaint at 8, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(No. 1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
129 Note that if the source videos that have been uploaded onto the YouTube site are eliminated,
the videos embedded or shared elsewhere on the web are also terminated. See YouTube Community
Guidelines, http://www.youtube.eom/t/community-.guidelines (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). If a video is
removed from the site (the source) the same embedded video will be disabled on all other sites as the
source video has been taken down. Id.
130 Complaint at 6-7, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461(S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(No. 1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
131 See Nate Anderson, YouTube Does Damage Control: Filtering Tools Not Just Reserved for
Partners,ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/02/8901 .ars.
YouTube admits that it does have a certain tools available only to its partners, including audio
fingerprinting technology that record labels have access to. But filtering is complicated business;
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has reported to Louis L. Stanton, a federal judge in the Southern District of
New York, that FBI-quality fingerprinting technology will be in place by
September 2008.132 Whether the development of such technology negates
an inference of "material contribution" or "inducement," or whether it is
seen as a knee-jerk reaction to a one billion dollar lawsuit is a question to
be determined by a fact-finder at trial.133
Turning towards vicarious liability, Viacom must prove that YouTube:
(1) had a right and ability to control infringing activity; and (2) that they
profited from such infringing activity.1 34 As Napster 11135 instructs, the
profit need not be directly attributable to the infringement, but as long as
the infringement attracts more customers, who, in turn, act as a draw to

YouTube can't simply fingerprint every song in existence and then filter that music from the
site, for instance, because "we will necessarily block videos containing music content licensed
to us by our music label partners as well as videos containing 'fair uses' of that music." The
same thing is true for video. Even if YouTube can develop a reliable way to detect copyrighted
material, it has no way of knowing whether that material was uploaded with the owner's
permission. Many copyright holders upload clips and even longer works in the hope of building
buzz, and fair use is again a concern. By contrast, filtering out pornography, which YouTube
already does, is easy to do, as "anyone can spot it just by looking at it."
Id.
132 See Cade Metz, YouTube Video-Fingerprinting Due in September, THE REGISTER,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/07/30/youtube-video..fingerprinting-due-in-fall/
(explaining the
problems with YouTube's current systems in place for policing infringement); see also Licino, infra
note 141 (discussing the new fingerprint recognition algorithm system to be in by September 2008).
133 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In that case,
the court noted that injunction may be granted as to infringing uses of a dual-use product while still
allowing the continuance of noninfringing uses to the extent made possible by filtering technology. Id.
The court states,
A permanent injunction will issue requiring StreamCast to reduce Morpheus's infringing
capabilities, while preserving its core noninfringing functionality, as effectively as possible.
StreamCast's duties will include, but not necessarily be limited to: (1) a filter as part of future
Morpheus software distributed to the public; and (2) steps to encourage end-user upgrades
from non-filtered legacy software. Such duties represent the proper balance between
competing interests. Plaintiffs' copyrights can be protected to the extent feasible, but
Morpheus's noninfringing uses will not be completely enjoined.
Id. at 1236. See also Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc. v. GlobalSantafe Corp., 2006 WL
3813778, at * 10 (S.D. Tex. 2006). The court would not grant a permanent injunction to stop all business
because non-infringing uses would be affected as well. Id. Rather the court held "that the permanent
injunction should require [defendant] to implement the structural modifications described . . . that
would prevent future infringement with minimal disruption to [defendant's] ability to fulfill its ongoing
contracts..." Id.
134 See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding
that the "innocent" infringer must suffer where they had an opportunity to put a stop to the
infringement, but failed to exercise this opportunity and instead profited from the infringement); see
also Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns and Mullen Advertising, Inc. 345 F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2003)
(stating the elements of vicarious liability in copyright infringement cases are broader than traditional
employee-employer relationship).
135 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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advertisers, the profit prong of the Shapiro test is satisfied. 136 It seems
evident that the infringing content on YouTube's servers attracts some
users. Viacom points this out in its complaint by noting that infringing
copies of its programming have been "viewed an astounding 1.5 billion
times."1 37 As YouTube tracks the hits that any one video gets, this number
is most likely grounded in fact, and as the adage goes, 1.5 billion people
don't lie. In count IV of the complaint, Viacom ties this increase in user
base to profitability by noting that "[d]efendants derive substantial
advertising revenue tied directly to the volume of traffic they are able to
attract to the YouTube site [via infringing videos].' 138
Turning to the control prong of the Shapiro test, the cornerstone of
Viacom's argument is that YouTube exercises its right to control content
towards its partners who have granted YouTube licenses, but refuses to do
the same to hold-outs like Viacom.139 Viacom asserts that this is
tantamount to coercion and that it presents a catch-22; content owners must
choose to grant licenses to YouTube below the fair market value or have
their copyright continually infringed upon.140 As noted above, YouTube
contends that the filtering technology is not yet up to par but plans to
launch effective fingerprinting software, known as "Claim Your Content,"
by September, 2008.141 Philip S. Beck, attorney for YouTube, says "the
new technology [will] allow copyright holders to provide a unique "digital
fingerprint" on their product which [will] shut down playback ability

136 See supra text accompanying note 41 (noting that financial benefit exists where the availability
of material acts as a draw for customers); see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
263 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing some types of substantial financial benefits one can reap where
infringing performances enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers).
137 Complaint at 3, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No.
1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
138 Id. at 85.
139 See id. at 64 (claiming that YouTube engaged in practices to enforce content restrictions and
protect the copyrighted works of its business partners, but withholds these same protections for the
copyrights of persons, including Plaintiffs, who have not granted licenses to YouTube).
140 See id. at 7 (arguing that YouTube had deliberately withheld the application of available
copyright protection measures in order to coerce rights holders to grant it licenses on favorable terms);
see also Anne Broache and Greg Sandoval, Viacom sues Google over YouTube clips, CNET News,
March 13, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1030_3-6166668.html (discussing Viacom's accusations of
selective filtering).
141 Hal Licino, YouTube's Digital Fingerprinting Technology to Include AutoShutDown, Due
September, WEBTVWIRE, July 28, 2007, http://www.webtvwire.com/youtubes-claim-your-content-toinclude-autoshutdown-coming-this-fall! (reporting the fall release for YouTube's "Claim Your
Content"); see also Larry Neumeister, YouTube Preps Video Fingerprinting,WASH. POST, July 27,
2007, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/27/AR2007072701
665.html (discussing YouTube's new technology to stop unauthorized posting of copyrighted material).
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within "a minute or so" if the video[s] [are] illegitimately shared."1 42 Thus,
the issue of control and, in turn, vicarious liability probably turns on
whether the finder of fact believes that YouTube has been attempting to
implement this type of monitoring software sua sponte to comply with
copyright law, or whether its implementation is a reactionary measure in
43
response to potential injunction and/or monetary liability. 1
B. The Sony Defense: Available, but Outmoded?
It is clear that YouTube.com offers a substantial amount of noninfringing activity on its website. Examples are legion; thousands of
people upload their opinions, video-blogs, home-videos, user-generated
music videos and video-art, to list a few examples. 144 According to these
uses and absent any active inducement per Grokster III, the Sony defense
seemingly absolves YouTube of liability, since it applies to dual use
devices that are capable of "substantial non-infringing [use]."1 45 However,
to hang one's hat on Sony as a viable defense is to misunderstand the
convoluted and uncertain nature of the law of secondary liability. The
concurring opinions in Grokster III suggest that the applicability of the
Sony safe harbor in the digital age is anything but a foregone conclusion.146
Courts have been moving away from the safe harbor. A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc. again proves instructive. 14 7 That court refused to apply
Sony's "staple article of commerce" doctrine due to Napster's "ongoing
control over its service," noting that in Sony, "the defendant's participation
did not extend past the manufacturing and selling the VTRs".148 The court
contrasted this with the Napster service that "maintains and supervises an

142 Licino, supranote 141.
143 See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 656 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that if future assurances of
compliance alone could prevent compliance then all injunctions may be defeated); see also MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing the likelihood
of continued infringement in the absence of an injunction due to StreamCast's illegal objective).
144 See generally YouTube.com, http://www.youtube.com (last visitedApr. 22, 2010) (displaying
currently featured user generated videos).
145 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that an
injunction may be defeated by significant non-infringing uses which would be prevented by the
injunction).
146 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 962 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). It is
important to remember that Sony was decided in an era that did not comprehend the ease and ubiquity
of making near-perfect digital reproductions of copyrighted works on a massive scale as is done today.
147 114 F. Supp. 2d. 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
148 Id. at 916.
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integrated system that users must access to upload or download files." 149
The court elaborated: "[c]ourts have distinguished the protection Sony
offers to the manufacture and sale of a device from scenarios in which the
defendant continues to exercise control over the device's use."15 0 It is
abundantly clear that YouTube migrates more towards the Napster end of
the spectrum than the VTR end; it continues to provide its web-service and
video players to account holders and viewers alike.
Due to the uncertainty of the Sony staple article defense, it is no wonder
that litigators are turning towards the statutory defense penned by the
legislature that was drafted with digital and internet technologies
specifically in mind, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.151
YouTube does in fact claim protection under both safe harbors, but most
commentators agree that the YouTube/Viacom fight will be largely over
52
the scope of the DMCA's protection.1
C. Applicability of the DMCA safe harborsto YouTube
As noted in section I(C) of this note, eligibility under DMCA section
512(c) protection requires conformity to the threshold requirements found
in section 512(i). This section requires a reasonably implemented policy
that allows for the termination of repeat infringers.] 53 The service provider
must communicate this policy to subscribers or account holders, and also
149 Id. at 917.
150 Id.
151 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (outlining that a service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief
for infringement of copyright by reason of storage); see also Answer, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube,
Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 1:07-cv-02103), 2007 WL 1724620 (arguing that
Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part because Defendants are protected by one or more of the
DMCA Safe Harbors).
152 See Eric Goldman, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster: An Analysis for Litigators and Business,
CIPERATI, Sept. 2005, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL320010pub/newsletter/0008/.
The Court's characterization of Sony as a "safe harbor" underscores that it affords a
defense which - in addition to the safe harbor liability limitations of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512- potentially insulates legitimate technology
developers and service providers from contributory or vicarious liability for third-party acts
of infringe-ment. The uncertain contours of the Sony safe harbor, however, could make it
more difficult for defendants to avail themselves of this defense prior to development of a
complete evidentiary record at trial.
Id. See also Russ Versteeg, Viacom v. YouTube: PreliminaryObservations,9 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 43, 66.
"Given the complex nature of the factual and legal issues presented by Viacom's complaint, it seems
most likely that the outcome of the case will center on the court's interpretation of the DCMA as to
whether a website such as YouTube comes within the safe harbors designed for ISPs." Id.
153 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2009). "The limitations on liability established by this section shall
apply to a service provider only if the service provider had adopted and reasonably implemented ... a
policy that provides for the termination ... of ... repeat infringers .... ". Id.
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must accommodate and not interfere with copyright holders' attempts to
identify or protect their material. 154
YouTube's Terms of Use provide that "YouTube will terminate a User's
access to its Website if, under appropriate circumstances, they are
determined to be a repeat infringer."l55 Users must agree to the terms of
use before becoming an account holder on the website.156 Only account
holders may upload videos; therefore, only account holders are able to
directly infringe via YouTube's website.157 All account holders of
YouTube are, therefore, put on notice of the repeat infringer accounttermination policy. There is also evidence suggesting that YouTube
actually terminates account-holders identified as repeat infringers.158
Based on the rulings in Ellison159 and Corbis Corp.,160 it appears that
YouTube has reasonably implemented its policy. YouTube provides a
clear channel through which copyright holders can contact the company to
complain of user-uploaded infringing content. In fact, in its terms of use,
YouTube delineates exactly how to provide DMCA-compliant notice and
also provides the name, mailing address, email address, and fax number of
the copyright agent designated to receive complaints. 161
154 See id. "The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider
only if the service provider accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures." Id.
155 YouTube.com, Terms of Use, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
156 YouTube.com, Create Your YouTube Account, http://www.youtube.com/signup (last visited
Mar. 18, 2008).
157 This syllogism excludes allegations of direct infringement against YouTube itself for public
display and reproduction of these videos. Viacom's direct infringement claims are not discussed in this
note.
158 See Posting of Mia to The YouTube Blog, http://www.youtube.com/blog?entry=VaLXzl92t9M
(Feb. 12, 2007) (responding to requests for account reinstatements by noting that the DMCA requires
the termination of repeat infringer accounts); see also Posting of David King to The Official Google
Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/10/latest-content-id-tool-for-youtube.html (Oct. 15, 2007,
2:01 PM) (noting that repeat infringer accounts are terminated based on DMCA notices issued to
YouTube by copyright holders); Marguerite Reardon, Perez Hilton Dumps YouTube, CNET NEWS,
Dec. 21, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9837191-7.html?%5E$
(describing the
termination of the account of Perez Hilton, a popular entertainment reporter, based on DMCA notices
received by YouTube).
159 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that AOL's failure to close its old email account
or forward emails from the old account to the new account allowed for potential copyright infringement
notices to go unnoticed, thus, the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that AOL had
reasonably implemented a policy against repeat infringers).
160 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1103-04 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting that Amazon reasonably
implemented a repeat infringer policy despite the reappearance of certain vendors under different user
names, that reasonability, not perfection, is the measure of a sufficient policy, and that Amazon did not
have to actively investigate alleged infringements).
161 YouTube.com, Terms of Service, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Apr. 22, 2010)
(providing Copyright Agent contact information and stating that DMCA notification requires providing
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Viacom's principal contention regarding section 512(i)'s threshold
requirement is that YouTube interferes with efforts by copyright owners to
identify their works on YouTube's servers. As Noted in section II (A),
plaintiffs allege that YouTube interferes with their ability to find their
copyrighted works by allowing account holders to designate that only
"friends" 162 may view their videos and by limiting search results to 1,000
returns. This argument has some teeth to it, as the alleged interference
prevents Viacom and other copyright holders from effectively searching for
their content. However, it seems to be at odds with the DMCA's
requirement that service providers not "interfere with standard technical
measures" used by copyright holders to identify their proprietary works. 163
The same argument applies to YouTube's decision to return only 1,000
results per search. It is difficult to predict the weight that a court will give
these contentions. On one hand, from a common sense standpoint, it is
clear that YouTube did not institute either of these policies in order to
thwart attempts by copyright holders to find their protected works.
Undoubtedly the "friends" feature was developed to enhance user
enjoyment of the service. For instance, many users may hesitate to post a
compromising, embarrassing, or private home-video only to have it
subjected to the vitriolic and insensitive commentary of YouTube users at64
large, preferring instead to share it with a small group of online friends.1
The limit on search returns may have an even more pragmatic origin:
server efficiency. 165
It is likely that a court will look to YouTube's intent behind instituting

the Copyright Agent with the following information in writing: a physical or electronic signature of a
person authorized to act on behalf of an allegedly infringed right, identification of the infringed
copyrighted work, identification of the infringing material or activity, reasonably sufficient contact
information, a good faith statement expressing the belief that the use of the material is not authorized by
the owner, its agent, or the law, and a statement that information provided is accurate and under penalty
of perjury).
162 YouTube.com, YouTube Help, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=
en&answer=157177 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010) (stating that videos set to private can only be viewed by
the account holder and invited friends, and will not show up in search results).
163 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).
164 See Foenyx's Channel, YouTube.com, http://www.youtube.com/user/foenyx (last visited Apr.
22, 2010) (decrying insensitive comments made about the user's videos and requesting that subscribers
to user's channel refrain from posting such comments); see also Akeerah27's video, Youtube.com,
Army, Chris Daughtry (Home), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwslNklasgE (last visited Apr. 22,
2010) (requesting that viewer's not post rude comments to user's tribute video to the user's brother).
165 See Posting of Eloy Lafuente to Tracker, http://tracker.moodle.org/si/jira.issueviews:issuehtml/MDLSITE-570/MDLSITE-570.html (Sept. 9, 2007, 16:23:07 WST) (suggesting that limiting
search results to 1,000 would free up, and speed up, the server during queries and forum searches at
moodle.org).
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the "friends" and "limited search" policies. The effects on copyright
holders' ability to search for their proprietary works seem incidental and
fairly insignificant compared to the utilitarian value of such service
features, at least without further data showing a large impact on
identification of infringement. On these facts, it appears that YouTube
satisfies the threshold requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
Moving on to the actual safe harbors under section 512(c)(1), Viacom
contends that YouTube has knowledge of infringing content on its servers
through DMCA compliant notification as well as through the
overwhelming volume and prevalence of infringing videos, which it claims
raises "red-flags" to even a "casual observer." 166 Since YouTube openly
admits to receiving take-down notices, they are almost certain to be
deemed to have actual knowledge of infringement per section
512(c)(1)(A)(i).167 This should be enough to shift the burden to YouTube
to prove that they have responded "expeditiously" to remove infringing
content. 168 However, it would be useful for Viacom to prove that "red
flags" have constructively alerted YouTube to infringement, because, if
proven, it places the onus on YouTube to remove such content without
requiring a DMCA take-down notice from the copyright holder. This is
one of the end-goals 6 9 of production companies in this type of suit, but
current precedent makes this a burdensome task. 170
166 See Complaint at
36, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (No. 1:07cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611.
167 See News Cloud, http://www.newscloud.con-lread/YouTube TakesDown_ComedyCentral_
Clips.Based on.DMCAClaims (last visited Sept. 8, 2009) (describing Viacom's takedown request);
see also Nate Anderson, YouTube to McCain: No Special treatment for DMCA Takedowns, ARS
TECHNICA, Oct. 15, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/10/youtube-to-mccain-no-specialtreatement-for-dmca-takedowns.ars (describing YouTube's response to proposals for combating DMCA
abuse).
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A)(iii) (2000).
169 Production companies and other copyright holders feel that they should not be required to
constantly devote resources to finding infringing content and issuing take-down notices, especially
when any individual YouTube user can simply re-upload the video at issue, alter a single frame of an
infringing video to get around YouTube's primordial filtering technology, or create new accounts with
slightly altered names. The pending litigation seeks to place more of a burden on the service provider to
ensure that their service is not a conduit for infringement. Complaint at 36, Viacom Int'l Inc. v.
Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 1:07cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611. The
complaint alleges that "copyright holders are required to police YouTube on an hourly basis to ensure
that they have issued take-down notices for all of their proprietary content." Id. See Robert Tur v.
Youtube, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50254, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. 2007). The court noted that the "right
and ability to control" infringing activity has been held to mean "something more" than just the ability
of a service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on its website in the context of
DMCA. Id.
170 Perfect /0, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that it needs to
"be apparent that the website instructed or enabled users to infringe another's copyright," and finding
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Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled, in Perfect
10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,171 that a service provider did not have to police its
websites for infringing pictures absent DMCA compliant notification under
section 512(c)(3) based on its provision of service to websites called
"illegal.net" and "stolencelebritypics.com."1 72 Most precedent corroborates
the view that service providers are not required to affirmatively police their
servers for infringing content. 173 An interesting facet of this case is that it is
alleged that YouTube does police its servers to remove violent and
pornographic material.174 YouTube has not admitted to any such
affirmative policing in a press release, but it does invite users to flag
content that they feel is inappropriate.17 5 Nevertheless, if the court finds
that YouTube does take it upon itself to police its servers for such content,
as Viacom alleges, 176 the court may infer that they have raised their own
red flags and could potentially impose an affirmative duty to take down
infringing content without having received section 512(c)(3) notices. This
would be a startling interpretation of the DMCA from the viewpoint of
service providers and may be better dealt with by an amendment to the
statute.
YouTube argues that they respond expeditiously to remove infringing
content once they receive DMCA-compliant take-down notices. There is
no precedent for what it means to respond "expeditiously," but it is clear
that YouTube does indeed respond by removing such videos and
that the burden of determining whether passwords on a website "enabled" infringement could be not on
the service provider).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1109 (holding that these domain names were intended to entice users based on their
"salacious" appeal, and that CCBilI was not required to police its servers to discover the presence of
infringing content); see also Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc., 2002 WL 1997918 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (finding a letter sent by record companies' trade organization to Internet service provider
insufficient to put Internet site operator on notice of any alleged copyright infringement under the
Digital Millenium Copyright Act, because letter solely listed recording artists' names).
173 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
174 See Complaint at 6, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(No. 1:07cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611. (stating that "YouTube proactively reviews and removes
pornographic videos from its library, but refuses to do the same thing for videos that obviously infringe
Plaintiffs' copyrights.").
175 See YouTube.com, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact sheet (last visited
Mar. 31, 2008) (explaining that the users can flag content that they feel is inappropriate and once it is
flagged, YouTube reviews the content and removes it from the system within minutes if it violates their
Terms of Use).
176 Complaint at 8, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(No. 1:07cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611 (claiming that YouTube proactively reviews and removes
pornographic videos from its library, but refuses to do the same thing for videos that obviously infringe
Plaintiffs' copyrights).
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terminating accounts. 177 Unless Viacom can show an undue delay in such
removal, YouTube should carry this issue at trial.
Viacom's next argument is that YouTube is not eligible for section
512(c) protection because they control and directly profit from the
infringing content on their servers. 178 Turning first to the issue of control,
Viacom uses a myriad of facts to show that YouTube exerts control over
infringing content on its servers. They point out that YouTube actually
performs the videos via its website and through its embeddable players.1 79
Also, as noted when discussing the so-called "red flag" constructive
notification, it is alleged that YouTube seeks to proactively control
pornographic and violent content by searching out and removing such
content. 180 This is a formidable argument for control. Plaintiffs essentially
argue that if YouTube polices its servers for these types of content, it
should do so for obviously infringing content as well.181 Plaintiffs extend
this argument to say that YouTube does not remove infringing content
because such content is the cornerstone of its business. Viacom contends
that the infringing content acts as a huge draw for users, which, in turn acts
as a huge draw for advertisers. 182
As to the required "direct financial benefit," Viacom will have difficulty
convincing a court that advertising revenue generated as a result of direct
infringement by account holders constitutes such a direct benefit. The
House Report issued with the DMCA instructs that "where the infringer
makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider's

177 See, e.g., Posting of Jordan Golson to Valleywag, http://valleywag.com/335795/the-fatalmisstep-that-got-perez-hilton-banned (Dec. 19, 2007, 14:41 EST) (noting that Perez Hilton's videos
were removed and his account terminated due to repeated copyright infringement); Posting of Liz
Gannes to Newteevee, http://newteevee.com/2009/05/05/20th-century-fox-sics-takedown-notices-onits-own-mashup-promotion (May 5, 2009, 17:15 PST) (noting that a commentator's YouTube account
was "permanently disabled" due to a copyright claim).
178 Complaint at 38, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(No. 1:07cv-02103), 2007 WL 77561 l(arguing that YouTube profits handsomely from the presence of
the infringing works on its site).
179 See id. at 4 (claiming that it is YouTube that knowingly reproduces and publicly performs the
copyrighted works uploaded to its site).
180 See id. at 38 (explaining that YouTube proactively reviews and removes pornographic videos
from its library, but refuses to do the same thing for videos that obviously infringe Plaintiffs'
copyrights).
181 See id. (noting that YouTube proactively reviews and removes pornographic videos from its
library, but refuses to do the same thing for videos that obviously infringe Plaintiffs' copyrights).
182 See id. at 5 (arguing that YouTube deliberately built up a library of infringing works to draw
traffic to the YouTube site, enabling it to gain a commanding market share, earn significant revenues,
and increase its enterprise value).
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service" there will be no direct financial benefit.18 3 No YouTube account
holders pay any fee, so it is difficult to see a financial benefit that is
directly attributable to the infringing activity in this case. Viacom will
need to urge the court to broaden its conception of this language, urging an
interpretation more akin to common law vicarious liability, where
infringement need only act as a draw for users to satisfy its "profit"
prong.1 84 Viacom is likely to emphasize the vast amount of website traffic
that is due to the viewing of infringing content, and the corresponding
advertising premiums generated by such high-volume traffic, in order to
85
sway a court that YouTube profits directly from infringement.1
YouTube denies both that they have an ability to control infringement
and also that they derive any direct financial benefit from such
infringement.1 86 Likely, YouTube will characterize its removal of
pornographic and violent content as an action taken solely in response to
user-generated complaints as opposed to an affirmative policing of its
servers. 187 Additionally, YouTube will argue that its performance of useruploaded, infringing content is an automated service, and is provided to any
video uploaded by users, without respect to its proprietary character.
Therefore, defendants will argue that they do not "have the right and ability
to control" the infringing activity. 188 There is support for this proposition
in case law. In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon was held not to
183 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998).
184 See supra text accompanying note 43.
185 See Posting of Fred Wilson to AVC, http://avc.blogs.com/a-vc/2006/09/youtubes.potent.html
(Sept. 7, 2006) (opining that YouTube could generate as much as $440 million dollars from advertising
revenue annually); see also Jessica E. Vascellaro & Emily Steel, Google Dealt Blow by Departure With Armstrong Gone, Search Giant Loses Executive With Big Connections, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16,
2001, at B7 (noting that YouTube has a projected net revenue of $500 million dollars from advertising
in 2009).
186 Answer, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y, 2007) (No. 1:07cv02103), 2007 WL 1724620.
187 See YouTube Pulls Some Pornography, Bans Children 'Under 13,' THINK & ASK,
http://www.thinkandask.com/news/030206-utube2.html. "We sent six IDs (of which were in violation
of YouTube policy) to Julie Supan, and the technical support staff at YouTube. After four attempts to
get YouTube to ban (at least) one ID in particular (THORO) after he posted explicitly sexual videos,
YouTube removed the first video on 26 February." Id. This is indicative of YouTube responding to
users flagging content rather than YouTube proactively and affirmatively policing its servers to remove
content based on its own investigative efforts. But see Virginia Heffernan, Image in a Haystack, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2009, at M14. "Scott Rubin, a YouTube spokesman, explained to me that the site does
supplement its community-flagging system with proprietary screening technology. This technology
somehow vets videos that have been flagged and helps the human reviewers prioritize which ones to
watch." Id. While YouTube supposedly does add to its flagging system, it is unclear just how intensive
their program is.
188 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
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have the right and ability to control infringing activity occurring on its
servers where they simply "provided [a] forum for an independent third
party seller to list and sell [their] merchandise."1 89 Such passive and
automated "assistance" to infringement may not be regarded by the
judiciary as an ability to control the infringement. There is a fine line,
however, between passivity and "willful blindness."' 190 This is another
point at which YouTube's efforts to institute effective fingerprinting
technology may be brought under close scrutiny to determine whether they
are actively seeking to curtail the infringing content appearing on their
servers or whether the identification technology is a liability-absolving
fagade.
Regarding the direct profit sub-prong, YouTube will rely on the House
Report issued alongside the DMCA 191 as well as persuasive authority from
the 4th Circuit.192 From a plain language standpoint, YouTube will point
out that since advertisers themselves are not infringing, there is no way that
they are profiting directly from infringement. It is conceivable that a court
will make an exception in this case and broaden the acceptable definition of
"direct financial benefit,"1 93 but following the black letter law and current
authority will result in YouTube carrying this issue as well.
Finally, YouTube responds expeditiously to the take-down notices it
receives per § 512(c)(1)(C). 194 Viacom does not contest this point. 195
189 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 at 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F.
Supp. 2d 688 at 704 n.9 (D. Md. 2001). "A finding that the 'right and ability 'right and ability to
control' standard could be met merely by the ability to remove or block access to materials would
render the DMCA internally inconsistent. The result would be that the very policy mandated by the
DMCA in § 512(c)(1)(C) to remain in the safe harbor, terminating infringers and blocking access,
would force service providers to lose their immunity by violating § 512(c)(1)(B)." Id.
190 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (2nd Pocket ed. 2002) (defining "willful blindness" as
"[d]eliberate avoidance of knowledge of a crime, esp. by failing to make a reasonable inquiry about
suspected wrongdoing despite being aware that it is highly probable").
191 105 H.R. REP. NO. 551, pt. 2,at 39(1998).
192 See Costar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 704-05 (D. Md. 2001) (relying on the House Report's
interpretation of "direct financial benefit"); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239
F.3d 619, 622 n.l (4th Cir. 2001) (clarifying that the plaintiff's claims were more properly classified as
contributory infringement, rather than direct infringement claims).
193 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(I)(B).
194 See supra text accompanying note 177; see also Nate Anderson, What fair use? Three strikes
and you're out . . . of YouTube, ARs TECHNICA, Jan. 15, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/01/what-fair-use-three-strikes-and-youre-out-of-youtube.ars (noting that film critic
Kevin Lee's YouTube videos were removed and his account closed after a third DMCA take-down
notice).
195 See Complaint, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No.
1:07cv-02103), 2007 WL 775611 (making no complaint with respect to YouTube's expeditious
response to take-down notices it receives).
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Instead, Viacom decries the unfairness of the burdensome task of
continually searching YouTube for infringing videos and having to issue
take-down notices, only to have the very same videos uploaded minutes
later by other users. 196
III.

SHOCKWAVES IN THE ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES

When drafting the DMCA, the legislature was clearly not considering a
service provider with such a high volume of user-uploaded content as
YouTube. 19 7 YouTube presents a unique case because of the site's
substantial non-infringing uses coupled with the rampant disregard of
copyright laws by many users. By enacting the DMCA, the legislature
intended to shield service providers from liability where they were not
profiting from infringing material and were not aware that such material
had been uploaded onto their servers. 1 98 Although YouTube has arguably
complied with this legislation, to allow service providers to escape liability
simply by responding to take-down notices, while turning a blind eye to a
huge amount of infringing content, is to put a far too onerous burden on
owners of intellectual property. Copyright holders, many of whom have
limited financial resources, would be forced to spend countless hours and
dollars patrolling the Internet in order to issue take-down notices and gain
the full proprietary value of their works. 199 Fortunately for copyright
holders, however, there are potential solutions to this dilemma other than
the ultimate decision in this lawsuit. The final section of this note suggests
196 See id. at T 6 (asserting the unfairness of burdening copyright owners with monitoring
YouTube on a daily or hourly basis in order to detect infringements and issue take-down notices, only
to have the same infringements remain on the site because other users upload the same videos).
197 See generally S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-I1(1998) (outlining the purpose of enacting WIPO
treaties); see also Samantha Schmidt, What Does YouTube Know?, 14 UNIV. OF WASH. CASRIP
NEWSL. 1 (2007), availableat http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/Default.aspx?article=
newsvl4i3Schmidt (stating that at the time the DMCA was crafted, Congress did not anticipate the
proliferation of creative content on "user-generated content" websites).
198 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, 11 (Dec.
1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf, Schmidt, supra note 197, at 8
(highlighting that the DMCA requires a service provider to not have the requisite level of knowledge of
infringing activity and to not have received a financial benefit from such activity in order for the
provider to be eligible for the "safe harbor" limiting its liability).
199 See Miguel Heift & Geraldine Fabrikant, WhoseTube?: Viacom Sues Google Over Video
Clips on Its Sharing Web Site, N.Y. TtMEs, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/03/14/technology/14viacom.html (noting Viacom CEO Phillipe Dauman's complaint that having
to "scour the entirety of what is available on YouTube" is "very difficult" and "places an enormous
burden" on the content owner); see also Schmidt, supra note 197 (noting that content owners of
copyrighted works "argue that they should not bear the sole burden for policing websites for
copyrighted material").
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a pair of likely candidates for such a solution.
A. YouTube Shoved by the Invisible Hand: The Free Market Solution
Production companies have already began to compete directly with
YouTube via their own video-on-demand websites. 200 Such competition
benefits these companies in a multitude of ways: (1) they are able to
potentially out-compete pirate sites by controlling the quality of their
output, (2) they are getting a head-start on the trend towards consolidating
the mediums through which different entertainment sources are viewed,
and (3) they are able to generate advertising revenue and promote their
products more efficiently by responding to consumer demand.
For illustrative purposes, this note will use the example provided by
Hulu.com, perhaps the first major example of such a service designed to
vie against YouTube for online-video supremacy. "Hulu" was launched on
March 12, 2008201 and represents a joint venture between NBC Universal
and News Corporation. Hulu focuses exclusively on professional content
202
and does not take on YouTube directly as a viral video destination.
However, Hulu does provide licensed content from a variety of sources,
which might also be available in unlicensed form on YouTube. 203 Hulu has
sole control over the access point of its content and can ensure that all
uploads are high-definition. This is in direct contrast to YouTube, where
204
users upload content of widely contrasting video quality and content.

200 See Sony eye Vio (tries) to Compete with
YouTube, The
UTube Blog,
http://theutubeblog.con/2007/04/26/sony-eyevio-tries-to-compete-with-youtube (last visited Apr. 22,
2010) (discussing Sony's addition to the list of major media corporations that plan on launching video
sharing sites to compete with YouTube); see also Jessi Hempel, Hulu 's Hurdles, CNN MONEY, Feb. 24,
2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/24/technology/hempelhulu.fortune.index.htm
(identifying
Hulu.com as the supposed "YouTube" killer launched by NBC Universal as a competitor).
201 Hulu Company Timeline, http://www.hulu.com/about/company-timeline (last visited Apr. 22,
2010) (indicating that Hulu launched on March 12, 2008); CrunchBase Company Profile, hulu,
http://www.crmchbase.com/company/hulu (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
202 See Hulu Media Info, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 22, 2010) (indicating that
Hulu makes available full and partial segments of movies and television shows rather than allowing
viral video uploads); see also Greg Sandoval, What does Hulu offer that YouTube doesn't?, CNET
NEWS, Apr. 17, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/what-does-hulu-offer-that-youtube-doesnt (commenting on
YouTube's attempts to make progress outside of viral video and the impact this attempt has on Hulu).
203 Users of YouTube are able to upload any content they have digitized whether or not they are
directly infringing by reproducing such content. See David R. Wetzel, YouTube: Why Is it So Popular?,
SUITE 101, Apr. 20, 2008, http://social-networkingtagging.suite 101 .com/article.cfim/youtube..whyjs_iit
so-popular.
204 Again, YouTube does not discriminate based on the quality of user videos and has adopted a
hands off approach to user-uploaded content provided that it is not flagged for removal. See YouTube
Community Guidelines, http://www.youtube.com/t/community__guidelines (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
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Hulu is ad-supported and requires viewers to watch limited commercials
throughout the broadcast. 2 05 The service also offers full-length movies and
206
episodes and is not constrained by YouTube's ten minute time limit.
Undoubtedly, these features will allow Hulu to draw away some viewers
that would have otherwise visited YouTube to view the content from an
infringing source.
Websites like Hulu.com also continue a trend of consolidating
entertainment sources within an on-demand internet based realm. 20 7 This
has been heralded within the music industry by the enormous popularity of
mp3 files and iTunes. 208 Companies which are able to harness a financially
sustainable strategy 209 for the provision of video and music content via ondemand internet-based services will be the forerunners of the entertainment
industry. Web services like Hulu.com represent a step in this forwardlooking direction. History has shown, from McDonald's to Wal-mart, that
consumers overwhelmingly choose speed and convenience. 210 There is no
reason to expect otherwise from the entertainment industry.
Finally, the benefit to a media company from generating advertising
revenue is obvious. As more viewers move away from the television set to
watch content online, so too will advertisers begin to divert their funds
towards that medium. Websites like Hulu.com that can first establish
themselves as the forerunners of such service providers will command the
highest advertising premiums.
205 See generally Hulu, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2010) (showing that after a user
watches a program, Hulu forces that individual to watch limited commercials during the video stream).
206 See Posting to The Write News, http://www.writenews.com/wnews.php?zone=330061 (Mar.
30, 2006) (quoting a YouTube press release: "We did some analysis of the videos in our system over 10
minutes in length, and we found the overwhelming majority of them were full length, copyrighted
videos from TV shows and movies.").
207 See Jim Tome, Social media consolidation continues: Facebook buys FriendFeed,
IMAGIN8MARKETING, Aug. 10, 2009, http://www.imagin8marketing.com/2009/08/10/social-mediaconsolidation-continues-facebook-buys-ftiendfeed (discussing the trend in social media consolidation in
the context of Facebook's purchase of FriendFeed); see also Marguerite Reardon, Hollywood Bashes
Media Consolidation, CNET NEWS, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.news.com/Hollywood-bashes-mediaconsolidation/2100-1026_3-6122447.html (noting individual opposition to the consolidation of the
entertainment industry).
208 See Apple Store, http://www.apple.com/itunes/whatson (last visited on Apr. 22, 2010)
(showcasing iTunes and related Apple products).
209 A sustainable strategy necessarily includes giving respect to intellectual property rights.
210 See Shopper Culture: Wal-Mart Dollar Stores Make a Comeback, http://www.shopperculture
.com/shopper.culture/retail/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (arguing that we live in an era and a
culture where convenience and time are extremely important); Smart Brief, Tim Horton's Increases
Speed and Conveniencefor U.S. Customers with MasterCard(R)PayPass(TM), http://www.smartbrief.
com/news/nra/industryPR-detail.jsp (last visited Apr. 22, 2010) (discussing Tim Horton's methods of
improving speed of services and making visits to store locations more convenient).
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B. FingerprintingTechnology May A llowfor the Coexistence of You Tube
alongsideNoninfringing Sites
YouTube claims that it is developing "FBI-quality" fingerprinting
software that will identify and automatically remove infringing videos
within one minute of upload. 2 11 Apart from its application to the Viacom v.
YouTube lawsuit, such technology, if effective, will allow the noninfringing
uses to be exclusive or near-exclusive uses, thus allowing YouTube to coexist with fully licensed sites like Hulu.com. The system requires that data
from copyright holders be provided to YouTube so that the ID software can
recognize such material as copyrighted and disable it.212 Some content
owners are unhappy with this solution because it requires copyright holders
to spend their time and resources to provide these digital fingerprints to
YouTube. 213 They are displeased that the burden of stopping infringement
has not shifted from the content owner to the YouTubes of the world. 2 14
They complain that instead of drafting take-down notices, they will now be
spending time and resources providing digital fingerprints to every site
employing filtering technology for each and every video they create, not to
mention their back catalogues.2 15

211 See Metz, supra note 132 (explaining YouTube's upcoming release of FBI-quality videofingerprinting technology); see also Cade Metz, Google Launches YouTube Video-Blocking
Contraption, THE REGISTER, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/16/google_unveils_
youtubevideoidentification/(discussing YouTube's release of FBI-quality video-fingerprinting
technology).
212 See Metz, supra note 132; see also YouTube, Owned by Google Inc., Will Use Technology to
Recognize Copyright-Infringing Videos on its Site by This Fall,CJREPORT, Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.
cjreport.com/news/103/youtube-use-copyright-checker-fall.html
(commenting on the release of FBIquality video-fingerprinting technology).
213 See Nate Anderson, Filter This: New YouTube Filter Greeted by Concerns Over Fair Use, ARS
TECHNICA, Oct. 16, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071016-youtube-launches-betavideo-filter-digital-rights-groups-shed-tear.html (discussing YouTube's fingerprinting technology);
Gigi Sohn, Google Blinks and Today the Internet is a Little Less Free, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 15,
2007, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1217 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010) (explaining the details of
YouTube's video fingerprinting system).
214 See Peter Burrows, Nabbing Video Pirates: Who Needs Google?, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 16,
2007, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2007ltc20071016_876447.htm (noting that
some content owners are displeased, claiming that providing digital fingerprints to the user-uploaded
video sites "wouldn't be good for the studios because [they]'d have to be pumping out fingerprints all
over the place"); Bill Rosenblatt, Google Launches Video Fingerprintingfor YouTube, DRM WATCH,
Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.drmwatch.com/ocr/article.php/3706016 (commenting on whether content
owners or YouTube bear responsibility for keeping copyrighted material off YouTube).
215 See Burrows, supra note 214 (stating that YouTube's new filtering system places an onerous
burden on the video's content owners.); see also ELINOR MILLS, GOOGLE UNVEILS YoUTUBE
ANITPIRACY TOOL, CNET NEWS, Oct. 15, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784-3-9797622-7.html
(explaining the burden placed on content owners who post videos on YouTube).
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The problem with such systems is that content owners need to
submit high-quality digital copies (or, in some cases, digital
fingerprints) of their works to every video sharing site that
operates a similar filtering system. Plenty of third-party
companies.., are also developing similar systems, but the
very proliferation of these filtering tools means more work for
the copyright holder. No central database for such works
appears to be on the horizon, so content owners will simply
2 16
have to deal with the hassle for now.
Other than placing an affirmative duty on YouTube and its ilk to police
their own servers for infringing content (a proposition that most case law
rejects), 2 17 this fingerprinting system seems to be the most reasonable
alternative. There is also talk of plans to direct viewers to content owners'
sites when viewers request a proprietary video. 218 This is an attractive
option for both service provider and content owner as it could include adrevenue sharing between referrer (YouTube) and referee (content
holder). 2 19
Following the Supreme Court's remand of Grokster III, the district court
for the Central District of California has already discussed the potential for
such fingerprinting technologies to prevent the non-infringing uses of dualuse products from ending up on the cutting-room floor due to permanent
injunction.2 20 There, the court, citing the Ninth Circuit in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., elaborated that copyright holders would be required to
provide notice of the presence of their copyrighted works to Streamcast
(the dual-use service provider) before Streamcast would be required to

216 Anderson, supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
218 See Anderson, supra note 213. "Owners can use the system to block videos, but they can also
choose to let such videos be uploaded for promotional use. Content owners can also choose to split ad
revenue with YouTube on video clips of material that they own." Id. See also ALEX WEPRIN,
ONSCREEN MEDIA SUMMIT YouTUBE 'S HOFNER SAYS MONETIZ4TION IS COMING, Broadcasting & Cable,
DEC. 2, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/print/l160175-OnScreenMedia_Summit_
YouTube s Hoffier__Says.Monetization isComing.php (announcing that YouTube is trying to work
with content owners to try to monetize YouTube for both parties).
219 See Anderson, supra note 213 (explaining that YouTube's new filtering system could provide
the content owner and YouTube the opportunity to share in the revenue from the videos); see also
TERRENCE RUSSELL, YoUTUBE'S NEW FILTER MAKES PRIVACY PROFITABLE... FOR GOOGLE, Wired,
Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2007/10/youtube-launche/ (discussing the possibility of
revenue sharing between YouTube and the content owner).
220 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1236 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(explaining that a solution allowing periodic re-briefings to the court based on technological filtering
advances for the Morpheus software would allow plaintiff's copyrights to be protected while not
enjoining Morpheus' noninfringing uses).
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filter out the works from their service. 22 1 This rule, if adopted in a majority
of jurisdictions, may serve to silence complaints by copyright holders
regarding the fingerprinting technology's requirement that digital
fingerprints be provided before the technology can recognize and filter
them out. 222 A mitigating solution to the burden placed on copyright
holders to provide digital fingerprints to all filtering service providers could
come in the form of a legislatively mandated, centralized database where
content owners are required to place fingerprint-copies of the works that
they wish to be filtered from dual-use sites. This would shift the burden to
YouTube-like sites to visit the database and ensure that the works therein
are filtered from their service.2 23 Obviously, this is only one of many
potential solutions and only time will tell how the various burdens
associated with fingerprinting technology will be shouldered.
CONCLUSION
The digital age has allowed for the near-perfect duplication of
copyrighted video and audio files using inexpensive and easy-to-use
technologies. Such technology has led to an explosion in copyright
infringement and the law has struggled to find a standard of protection that
both encourages the development of new technologies capable of noninfringing uses while simultaneously respecting the proprietary nature of
copyright. 224 Foreseeing such problems, Congress enacted the Digital
221 See id. at 1237 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1027 (9th Cir.
2001)) (noting "[W]e place the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works
and files containing such works available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable
access to the offending content").
222 See Burrows, supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (outlining content owners'
complaints regarding the provision of digital fingerprints); see also, Kevin M. Lemley, Protecting
Consumers From Themselves: Alleviating the Market Inequalities Created by Online Copyright
Infringement in the EntertainmentIndustry, 13 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TECH. 613, 627 (2003) (citing Napster
II, 239 F.3d at 1096-97) (discussing what copyright holders gain from the rule of providing notice).
223 This speculative solution begs a host of questions that will not be dealt with here. To name a
few: 1)Who will have access to these databases? 2) How will the fingerprinting technologies interface
with them? 3) Who will police the databases so that users are not simply using the digital copies on the
database to pirate copyrighted works?
224 See Brad Polizzano, Grokster Not the "Spirit in the Sky" Innovators Long For: Uncertain
Protection Forever Young Since the Birth of Peer-to-Peer, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.635
(2009)("[D]evelopers [assert] that they should not be liable for an end-user's behavior because if they
were, future innovators would be significantly deterred from creating new and improved technologies
due to fear of third-party liability.").:see also, Deborah A. Coleman, Antitrust Issues in the Litigation
and Settlement of Infringement Claims, 37 AKRON L. REv. 263, 266 (2004) (citing Intergraph Corp. v.
Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir. 1999)) (discussing the issue of balancing intellectual property
rights with fair competition and the antitrust laws).
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Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, which, among other things, provides
limitations on liability for service providers that unwittingly host infringing
content provided that they remove such content upon becoming aware of its
presence.2 25 The scope of the statute has received little interpretation by
courts, and Viacom wishes to test the limit of the available protections in
its upcoming suit against defendants YouTube.
Viacom alleges all forms of secondary infringement and seeks
clarification of the scope of the DMCA's protection afforded to a website
that contains a vast amount of infringing content. Viacom seeks to use this
lawsuit to maintain control over its proprietary works and to decry the
unfairness of having to continually scour YouTube (and the rest of the
web) for its copyrighted content and continually issue take-down notices
2 26
for such content, only to have it re-uploaded by another direct infringer.
YouTube contends that it goes above and beyond what the DMCA requires
and that it is also protected by the safe harbor provided by the Supreme
Court in Sony. 2 2 7
The lawsuit has the potential to shape the future for media and
entertainment providers as well as for YouTube and other similar websites.
Depending on the outcome of the lawsuit, content owners will have to
choose between using their own licensed, high-quality websites and
services 228 to out-compete services that provide infringing copies of their
video, or rely on filtering technologies employed by user-uploaded sites to
screen out and remove their content. 229 The outcome of the suit may also
determine the direction of the flow of advertising revenues, as where the
viewers go, the advertisers are sure to follow.
Ultimately, the determination of who will control the dissemination of
content (the copyright holders or the YouTube-like service providers) will
determine where the world turns to obtain entertainment, music, news and

225 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
226 This note's author also believes that Viacom's lawsuit may be motivated by other factors such
as, but not limited to: (1) the recovery of claimed or statutory damages, (2) the potential for settlement,
(3) gaining negotiating leverage in order to secure a better price for licensing its content to YouTube,
(4) crippling YouTube in order to leave the market open for a Viacom-controlled service.
227 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
228 Content owners may also license their content to other such online service providers.
229 Content owners may also arrange revenue-sharing agreements with such user-uploaded
websites. See Anderson supra note 218. See also Elliot M. Zimmerman, Entertainment,Arts and
Sports Law: P2P File Sharing: Direct and Indirect Copyright Infringement, 78 FLA. BAR J. 40, 44
(2004) (discussing the lack of clarity of distributing software, and how the outcome of lawsuit will
result in a large impact on user-uploaded cites and their listeners).
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other information. Indeed this issue goes to the heart of the incentives
involved in creating proprietary works. If copyright holders are not able to
control and profit from their own creative works, will the quantity and
quality of such works begin to decline as a result? The courts and
potentially the legislature will have to give pause to these concerns when
interpreting the scope of the DMCA's protections against secondary
copyright infringement in an ever-evolving and increasingly digital world.

